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Formulating a dynamic general equilibrium model of small open
economies su®ering from global pollution, welfare e®ects of foreign aid
are studied. We show that aid raises the global pollution and worsens
the donor's welfare in both the steady state and transition. On the other
hand, aid deteriorates the recipient's steady state welfare, whereas the
recipient's time path of welfare can improve under certain conditions.
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1 Introduction
This paper studies welfare e®ects of foreign aid in a dynamic context.
While there is an extensive literature in this ¯eld, this paper is di®erenti-
ated from the predecessors in two respects. First, we consider the e®ects
of foreign aid in the presence of transboundary pollution. Second, we ex-
clusively focus on dynamic e®ects of aid by building a dynamic general
equilibrium model. In the ¯rst respect, Naito (2003) proves the possibil-
ity of Pareto-improving aid under transboundary pollution. Chao and Yu
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own responsibility.
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(1999) and Hatzipanayotou et al. (2002) make welfare evaluations of tied
aid in a polluted world. All of these works rest on static models. In the
second respect, Shimomura (2007) and Naito and Ohdoi (2007) are notable
contributions. They show the possibility of Pareto-improving (untied) aid
in a two-country dynamic model. While the growth rate is exogenous in
Shimomura (2007), it is endogenous in Naito and Ohdoi (2007).
While environmental and dynamic aspects are important in discussing
foreign aid in the modern world, there is no work that incorporates both.
This paper makes a small step toward this direction. Constructing a dy-
namic two-country model of international trade with transboundary pol-
lution, this paper revists the welfare e®ects of aid.
We deviate from Shimomura (2007) and Naito and Ohdoi (2007) in two
respects. First, we assume away the terms of trade e®ect by presuming
that the international commodity prices are constant over time. It is well-
known that the terms of trade e®ect plays a central role in the argument
of foreign aid. However, it drastically makes the analysis quite intractable.
In order to overcome this analytical di±culty, we suppose two small open
countries.1) No terms of trade e®ect enables us to restrict attention to
how foreign aid a®ects welfare through accumulation of capital and pol-
lution. Second, our model is too speci¯ed as compared to Naito (2003)
and Shimomura (2007). In this sense, we recognize that the scope of our
analysis should not be overestimated, but our purpose in this paper is not
to pursue the generality of results but to derive de¯nite results in a simple
framework.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a model. Section 3
1) We never insist that the terms of trade is unimportant. The strategic use of the
assumption of small countries is made in Yano and Nugent (1999), Hatzipanayotou
et al. (2002), Chatterjee et al. (2003), and Chatterjee and Turnovsky (2004, 2007)
as well.
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makes comparative static and dynamic analyses. Based on them, Section
4 considers welfare e®ects of aid. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 A model
Consider two small open countries, Home and Foreign, which consume
two consumption goods, Goods 1 (non-numeraire) and 2 (numeraire). Let
p denote the relative price of Good 1 and be constant over time since the
two countries are too small to a®ect the world price. Home is a donor and
Foreign a recipient. An asterisk (*) is attached to the Foreign variables.
2.1 Home's fundamentals
Home's preference and technology are speci¯ed. The production side is
captured by a GDP function. We assume a Heckscher-Ohlin technology,
which makes the GDP function take a form of
r(p)K + w(p)L; (1)
where K and L are the endowment of capital and labor, and r and w
are the reward of capital and labor, respectively. Eq. (1) is obtained by
assuming that both goods are positively produced from capital and labor.2)
An important property of the GDP function is that the partial derivative
of the GDP function with respect to p gives the equilibrium supply of Good
1.
A pollutant is emitted proportionally to the output of Good 1. Given
the assumptions made so far, Home's representative consumer solves a
dynamic utility maximization problem:
2) Letting Ki=Li; i = 1; 2 denote the factor intensity of Good i, incomplete spe-
cialization is justi¯ed under maxfK1=L1; K2=L2g > K=L > minfK1=L1;K2=L2g.
Under this condition, the two factor prices are determined solely by the commodity
prices as r(p) and w(p).
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max
C1;C2
Z 1
0
e¡½t[® lnC1 + (1¡ ®) lnC2 ¡ sZ]dt; s; ½ > 0
subject to _K = r(p)K + w(p)L¡ pC1 ¡ C2 ¡ ±K ¡ T; ± 2 (0; 1)
_Z = r0(p)K + w0(p)L¡ °Z; ° 2 (0; 1);
where Ci; i = 1; 2 is consumption of Good i, Z the pollution stock, T the
income transfer, ½ the discount rate, s the marginal damage from pollu-
tion, and ± and ° are respectively the rate of depreciation of capital and
natural puri¯cation of pollution. This problem is solved with the aid of a
Hamiltonian:
H = ® lnC1+(1¡®) lnC2¡sZ+¸[r(p)K+w(p)L¡pC1¡C2¡±K ¡ T ]
+¹[r0(p)K + w0(p)L¡ °Z];
where ¸ and ¹ are the costate variable associated with two constraints.
Then, the ¯rst-order necessary conditions for optimality are
®
C1
= ¸p (2)
1¡ ®
C2
= ¸ (3)
_¸ = ¸(½+ ± ¡ r)¡ ¹r0 (4)
_¹ = ¹(½+ °) + s (5)
_K = rK + wL¡ 1
¸
¡ ±K ¡ T (6)
_Z = r0K + w0L¡ °Z (7)
0 = lim
t!1
e¡½t¸K = lim
t!1
e¡½t¹Z;
where (6) is obtained by substituting (2) and (3) into the °ow budget
constraint. The present dynamic general equilibrium system consists of
(4)-(7) whose endogenous variables are ¸; ¹;K and Z. However, we can
reduce them into a two-dimensional system.
Note that the time path of ¹ is solely determined by (5). Eq. (5) implies
that ¹(t) = ¡s=(½ + °) for any t ¸ 0 if the initial value of ¹ is chosen as
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¹(0) = ¡s=(½ + °).3) Then, substituting ¹ = ¡s=(½ + °) into (4) and
making the same argument as right above, ¸ also becomes time-invariant
so that ¸(t) = ¡sr0=(½ + °)(½ + ± ¡ r) for any t ¸ 0. Accordingly, all we
have to do is to consider (6) and (7).
2.2 Foreign's fundamentals
The Foreign economy is described. Pollution emitted in Home is trans-
boundary and ¯Z arrives in Foreign where ¯ 2 [0; 1]. As in Shimomura
(2007) and Doi, Iwasa and Shimomura (2007), Foreign is assumed to spe-
cialize to Good 2 by using labor only. Hence, letting the labor/output
coe±cient of Good 2 in Foreign be denoted by a¤2, the Foreign consumer's
problem is formulated as follows.
max
C¤1 ;C
¤
2
Z 1
0
e¡½
¤t[u¤(C¤1 ; C
¤
2 )¡ v¤(¯Z)]; ½¤; ¯ > 0
subject to _A¤ = r¤A¤ +
L¤
a¤2
¡ pC¤1 ¡ C¤2 + T;
where A¤ is the net credit in Foreign, and r¤ the interest rate. Note here
that L¤=a¤2 is the income from production of Good 2. The associated
Hamiltonian is
H¤ = u¤(C¤1 ; C
¤
2 )¡ v¤(¯Z) + ¸¤

r¤A¤ +
L¤
a¤2
¡ pC¤1 ¡ C¤2 + T

;
where ¸¤ is the costate variable. The maximum principle yields
@u¤(C¤1 ; C
¤
2 )
@C¤1
´ u¤1(C¤1 ; C¤2 ) = ¸¤p (8)
@u¤(C¤1 ; C
¤
2 )
@C¤2
´ u¤2(C¤1 ; C¤2 ) = ¸¤ (9)
_¸¤ = ¸¤(½¤ ¡ r¤) (10)
_A¤ = r¤A¤ +
L¤
a¤2
¡ pC¤1 ¡ C¤2 + T (11)
0 = lim
t!1
e¡½
¤t¸¤A¤:
3) For a more detailed argument, see Kemp, Long and Shimomura (2001).
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Based on the standard assumption in trade theory such that there is no
international ¯nancial market, the credit market in Foreign must be cleared
domestically, which means that A¤(t) = 0 for any t ¸ 0. In view of that
¸¤ represents a marginal utility of A¤, it follows that _¸¤(t) = 0 for any
t ¸ 0. Consequently, the demand function of each good is obtained by the
following `static' optimality conditions:
u¤1(C
¤
1 ; C
¤
2 )
u¤2(C
¤
1 ; C
¤
2 )
= p
pC¤1 + C
¤
2 =
L¤
a¤2
+ T:
The resulting demand functions are a function of p and income L¤=a¤2+T .
Substituting them into the utility function, Foreign's welfare is measured
by
W ¤ ´
Z 1
0
e¡½
¤t

V ¤

p;
L¤
a¤2
+ T

¡ v¤(¯Z)

dt; (12)
where V ¤(¢) is a standard indirect utility function.
3 Comparative statics and dynamics
While our model is quite speci¯ed, the speci¯city allows us to make
comparative static and dynamic analyses easily. As already mentioned, the
core system consists of (6) and (7). We apply the comparative dynamics
technique initiated by Oniki (1973) to them. Di®erentiating (6) and (7)
with respect to T , we have a system of variational equations:
_KT = (r ¡ ±)KT ¡ 1 (13)
_ZT = r
0KT ¡ °ZT ; (14)
where KT ´ dK=dT and ZT ´ dZ=dT . If the economy is initially in the
steady state, the coe±cients in (13) and (14) are all time-invariant and
hence they are a system of ordinary di®erential equations with constant
coe±cients. Resorting to the standard technique for solving di®erential
equations, the general solutions to (13) and (14) become
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KT (t) =
r ¡ ± + °
r0
A2e
(r¡±)t +KT (15)
ZT (t) = A1e
¡°t +A2e
(r¡±)t + ZT ; (16)
where A1 and A2 are arbitrary constants which correspond to the two
eigenvalues ¡° and r¡ ±, respectively. KT and ZT capture the e®ect of T
on the steady state value of K and Z. In other words, they are obtained
by di®erentiating the system of equations with _K = _Z = 0 and explicitly
represented by
KT =
1
r ¡ ± (17)
ZT =
r0
°(r ¡ ±) : (18)
As is clear from (15) and (16), we make the following assumption on
stability.
Assumption 1. r ¡ ± < 0.
Moreover, noting that ¸ = ¡sr0=(½+ ± ¡ r)(½+ °) is a marginal utility of
K, which must be positive from an economic viewpoint, we need:
Assumption 2. Good 1 is labor-intensive, i.e., r0 < 0.
It follows from Assumptions 1 and 2 that KT < 0 and ZT > 0, namely,
foreign aid reduces the steady state stock of capital and increases the steady
state pollution. The mechanism behind this observation comes from the
well-known Rybczynsky theorem. A reduction in capital decreases the
supply of the capital-intensive good (Good 2) and increases that of the
labor-intensive good (Good 1.) This, in turn, enhances pollution since
only the production of Good 1 generates pollutants.
The two constants A1 and A2 are determined by the initial conditions.
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Noting that KT (0) = ZT (0) = 0 because the initial value of both is histor-
ically given, and letting t! 0 in (15) and (16) yield
KT (0) = 0 =
r ¡ ± + °
r0
A2 +
1
r ¡ ±
ZT (0) = 0 = A1 +A2 +
r0
°(r ¡ ±) ;
by substituting (17) and (18) into (15) and (16). Solving for A1 and A2,
we have
A1 = ¡ r
0
°(r ¡ ± + °)
A2 = ¡ r
0
(r ¡ ± + °)(r ¡ ±) :
Accordingly, the pair of the solutions to (13) and (14) is derived as
KT (t) = ¡ 1
r ¡ ± e
(r¡±)t +KT
=
1
r ¡ ±
h
1¡ e(r¡±)t
i
> 0 (19)
ZT (t) = ¡ r
0
°(r ¡ ± + °)e
¡°t ¡ r
0
(r ¡ ±)(r ¡ ± + °)e
(r¡±)t + ZT : (20)
Summarizing the results obtained, we establish:
Proposition 1. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, foreign aid reduces both the
steady state stock and the time path of capital. On the other hand, the
steady state stock of pollution increases, whereas the e®ect on time path of
pollution is ambiguous.
Proposition 1 is of some interest according to which an acceptance of
foreign aid necessarily reduces the capital not only in the steady state
but also in the transition. In other words, the e®ect on the steady state
stock and the time path has the same direction. In contrast, the e®ect on
pollution can °uctuate between the steady state stock and the transition
path. As (18) shows, the steady state pollution increases as a result of aid.
However, such an incremental e®ect is not always the case in the transition
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(see (20)). This implies that the e®ect on the steady state welfare can be
di®erent from the e®ect on the lifetime utility.
4 Welfare e®ects of foreign aid
Having identi¯ed the impacts of foreign aid on the steady state stock
and the dynamic path of capital and pollution, we readily examine the
welfare e®ects. We will consider Home's welfare ¯rst and then proceed to
Foreign's welfare.
4.1 Home's welfare
In order to address the welfare e®ect on Home's welfare, we need to
express welfare as a function of T . Note that Home's instantaneous welfare
is
U ´ ® lnC1(¸p) + (1¡ ®) lnC2(¸p)¡ sZ(T );
where C1 and C2 are the solution to (2) and (3), both of which are inde-
pendent from T . Therefore, the e®ect of T becomes
dU
dT
= ¡sdZ
dT
= ¡ sr
0
°(r ¡ ±) < 0;
from Assumptions 1 and 2 and (18). This is a quite natural result because
aid increases the steady state pollution stock, which is harmful.
While the above ¯nding is restricted to the steady state, what e®ect on
the lifetime welfare follows? To answer this question, let us de¯ne
W ´
Z 1
0
e¡½t[® lnC1(¸p) + (1¡ ®) lnC2(¸)¡ sZ(T )]dt:
Then, if we assume that the economy is initially in the steady state, the
e®ect of T on W is calculated as follows.
| 49 |
経済学論究第 62 巻第 4 号
dW
dT

T=0
=
Z 1
0
e¡½tsZT dt
= ¡s
Z 1
0
e¡½t

¡ r
0
°(r¡±+°)e
¡°t¡ r
0
(r¡±)(r¡±+°)e
(r¡±)t+ZT

dt
= ¡s
Z 1
0
e¡½t

¡ r
0
°(r ¡ ± + °)e
¡°t ¡ r
0
(r ¡ ±)(r ¡ ± + °)e
(r¡±)t
+
r0
°(r ¡ ±)

dt
= ¡ sr
0
½(½+ °)(r ¡ ± ¡ ½) < 0:
Thus, while the e®ect on the dynamic path of Z is ambiguous, the e®ect
on Home's welfare is the same between the steady state and the transition.
This is formally stated in:
Proposition 2. Foreign aid lowers not only the steady state level but the
lifetime level of Home's welfare.
4.2 Foreign's welfare
Turn to the e®ect on Foreign's welfare. In view of that (12) de¯nes the
lifetime welfare, the steady state welfare is de¯ned by
U¤ ´ V ¤

p;
L¤
a¤2
+ T

¡ v¤(¯Z):
Hence, di®erentiating with respect to T yields
dU¤
dT
= V ¤I ¡ ¯v¤
0
(¯Z)
dZ
dT
= V ¤I ¡ ¯v
¤0r0
°(r ¡ ±) ; (21)
where V ¤I (¢) denotes the partial derivative of V ¤(¢) with respect to L¤=a¤2+
T and the second equation follows from (18). While the ¯rst term in (21)
captures the direct income e®ect of transfer and is positive, the second is
the indirect e®ect through transboundary pollution and is negative. Con-
sequently, the total e®ect is ambiguous and it is trivial that Foreign gains
from aid if and only if the former e®ect dominates the latter. We will give
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a simple example to ensure such a welfare improvement for Foreign.
Before presenting an example which leads to an improvement in For-
eign's welfare, let us address the e®ect of aid on the lifetime welfare. The
discounted sum of utility is given in (12). Making use of it, the impact of
aid on W ¤ is
dW ¤
dT

T=0
=
Z 1
0
e¡½
¤t
h
V ¤I ¡ ¯v¤
0
ZT
i
dt
=
Z 1
0
e¡½
¤t

V ¤I ¡ ¯v¤
0

¡ r
0
°(r ¡ ± + °)e
¡°t
¡ r
0
(r ¡ ±)(r ¡ ± + °)e
(r¡±)t + ZT

dt
=
Z 1
0
e¡½
¤t

V ¤I ¡ ¯v¤
0

¡ r
0
°(r ¡ ± + °)e
¡°t
¡ r
0
(r ¡ ±)(r ¡ ± + °)e
(r¡±)t +
r0
°(r ¡ ±)

dt
=
V ¤I
½¤
¡ ¯v
¤0r0
½¤(½¤ + °)(r ¡ ± ¡ ½¤) : (22)
As in the case of the steady state welfare, the ¯rst term in (22) gives a direct
income e®ect, whereas the second the losses from pollution magni¯ed by
aid.
Eqs. (21) and (22) convince us that Foreign gains from aid if and only
if the direct income e®ect overweighs the losses from pollution. Then, one
may naturally ask whether there is an example which ensures Foreign's
gain. The rest of this section presents a possibly simplest example. Suppose
that Foreign's felicity function is quasi-linear:
u¤(C¤1 ; C
¤
2 )¡ v¤(¯Z) = eu(C¤1 ) + a¤C¤2 ¡ s¤¯Z;
eu0(¢) > 0; eu00(¢) < 0; a¤; s¤ > 0:
Then, the conditions for welfare improvements are obtained as follows.
steady state welfare :
dU¤
dT
> 0 () a¤ > s
¤¯r0
°(r ¡ ±) (23)
lifetime welfare :
dW ¤
dT
> 0 () a¤ > s
¤¯r0
(½¤ + °)(r ¡ ± ¡ ½¤) : (24)
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Therefore, all we can state is:
Proposition 3. The e®ects on Foreign's welfare is ambiguous. However,
supposing a quasi-linear preference and the marginal utility of income is
large enough to satisfy (23) and (24), foreign aid is bene¯cial to Foreign
both in the steady state and in the transition.
While Proposition 3 concerns the su±cient condition for aid to be gain-
ful to the recipient in the steady state and transition, we have another
possibility. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, one can verify that
s¤¯r0
°(r ¡ ±) >
s¤¯r0
(½¤ + °)(r ¡ ± ¡ ½¤) > 0;
and hence the following result can be established.
Corollary. Suppose a quasi-linear preference of Foreign. Then, an accep-
tance of aid reduces Foreign's steady state welfare, but raises its time path
of welfare under
s¤¯r0
°(r ¡ ±) > a
¤ >
s¤¯r0
(½¤ + °)(r ¡ ± ¡ ½¤) : (25)
The above corollary is of some use because it makes clear that the e®ect
on steady states can not necessarily carry over to the e®ect on time paths.
If we look at reality, the direct e®ect of transfer dominates in the short-
run. In this sense, aid should be accepted. However, it gradually increases
world pollution, which is likely to dominate in the long-run. Therefore,
the Foreign government may have an incentive to refuse the aid from a
long-run point of view.
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5 Concluding remarks
Making use of a simple dynamic model of international trade with en-
vironmental externalities, we have analytically examined welfare e®ects
of foreign aid. Under plausible assumptions, we have shown that (i) aid
raises both the steady state level and the time path of pollution, that (ii)
the donor necessarily loses from giving aid, and that (iii) the welfare e®ect
on the recipient is ambiguous. Result (iii) follows since the direct income
e®ect is positive but the indirect e®ect through pollution expansion is nega-
tive. However, we have provided a simple example with which the recipient
gains from aid.
Unlike the welfare e®ects on the donor, there emerges an interesting
contrast on the welfare e®ects on the recipient. Depending on the level
of marginal utility of income, it proves possible that the steady state wel-
fare decreases but the time path of welfare increases due to aid. This
observation captures an importance of dynamic considerations since the
comparative static results focusing on the steady state can not necessarily
apply to the change in time path.
However, despite the above virtues, we should recognize limitations in
this paper. As mentioned in Introduction, we have ignored the terms
of trade e®ect and made numerous speci¯cations and assumptions. In
discussing the welfare e®ects of foreign aid more properly, it is needed to
relax these restrictions. They are left as our future work.
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